pointed out by checkbashisms.
Note this kind of indirections can only be replaced directly in POSIX
by commands using eval.
Security risks must be evaluated for each context where eval is called.
For a safe use, the context must ensure that only a limited number of
possible constrainted values are passed to eval.
https://mywiki.wooledge.org/Bashism#Parameter_Expansions
https://mywiki.wooledge.org/BashFAQ/006#Indirection
Issue-ID: OOM-264
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Lambert <guillaume.lambert@orange.com>
Change-Id: Id27f3ffd1ddb092a9c038d3a45d9e3278720eb62
#!/bin/bash
+
set -e
# first arg is `-f` or `--some-option`
authenticator \
; do
var="CASSANDRA_${yaml^^}"
- val="${!var}"
+ # eval presents no security issue here because of limited possible values of var
+ eval val=\$$var
if [ "$val" ]; then
_sed-in-place "$CASSANDRA_CONFIG/cassandra.yaml" \
-r 's/^(# )?('"$yaml"':).*/\2 '"$val"'/'
for rackdc in dc rack; do
var="CASSANDRA_${rackdc^^}"
- val="${!var}"
+ # eval presents no security issue here because of limited possible values of var
+ eval val=\$$var
if [ "$val" ]; then
_sed-in-place "$CASSANDRA_CONFIG/cassandra-rackdc.properties" \
-r 's/^('"$rackdc"'=).*/\1 '"$val"'/'
#!/bin/bash
+
{{/*
# Copyright © 2019 Orange
# Copyright © 2020 Samsung Electronics
while read DB ; do
USER_VAR="MYSQL_USER_${DB^^}"
PASS_VAR="MYSQL_PASSWORD_${DB^^}"
- USER=${!USER_VAR}
- PASS=`echo -n ${!PASS_VAR} | sed -e "s/'/''/g"`
+{{/*
+ # USER=${!USER_VAR}
+ # PASS=`echo -n ${!PASS_VAR} | sed -e "s/'/''/g"`
+ # eval replacement of the bashism equivalents above might present a security issue here
+ # since it reads content from DB values filled by helm at the end of the script.
+ # These possible values has to be constrainted and/or limited by helm for a safe use of eval.
+*/}}
+ eval USER=\$$USER_VAR
+ PASS=$(eval echo -n \$$PASS_VAR | sed -e "s/'/''/g")
MYSQL_OPTS=( -h ${DB_HOST} -P ${DB_PORT} -uroot -p${MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD} )
echo "Creating database ${DB} and user ${USER}..."
#!/bin/bash
+
set -eo pipefail
shopt -s nullglob
mysql_error "Both $var and $fileVar are set (but are exclusive)"
fi
local val="$def"
+ # val="${!var}"
+ # val="$(< "${!fileVar}")"
+ # eval replacement of the bashism equivalents above presents no security issue here
+ # since var and fileVar variables contents are derived from the file_env() function arguments.
+ # This method is only called inside this script with a limited number of possible values.
if [ "${!var:-}" ]; then
- val="${!var}"
+ eval val=\$$var
elif [ "${!fileVar:-}" ]; then
- val="$(< "${!fileVar}")"
+ val="$(< "$(eval echo "\$$fileVar")")"
fi
export "$var"="$val"
unset "$fileVar"